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THE FUTURE OF RECIPROCITY: A STUDY IN ANTITRUST
DECISIONAL TECHNIQUE
INTRODUCTION
With deference to oversimplification, it may be said the Supreme
Court by numerous holdings' has denoted certain types of business agree-
ments as being per se violative' of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.8 Recent decisions,4 however, as well as articles' indicate that the
per se doctrine needs further delineation or, at a minimum, clarification
in respect to what is commonly called reciprocal dealing agreements.' The
need for clarification seems timely in the area which the Solicitor General
loosely labels "accommodation reciprocity."7
Reciprocity has been defined generally as any business dealing be-
tween independent firms whereby they make mutual concessions designed
to promote the business interests of each.8 Primarily as a result of three
decisions,' corporate advisors presently are unable to predict with cer-
tainty potential antitrust consequences resulting from a client's entering
into an agreement which provides for reciprocal dealing.'
One United States district court recently held" that since mutual
dealing agreements-heretofore unchallenged under the Sherman Act-
may result in restraining trade, such agreements consequently are within
1. E.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4383 (April 28,
1966) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) ; Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
2. These agreements, which subsequently will be more fully described, include:
price fixing; group boycotts; allocation of markets; allocation of customers, and tying
arrangements.
3. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
4. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592. United States v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; United States v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 35 U.S. LAW WEEK 2125 (Sept. 13, 1966).
5. Handler, The Polarities of Antitrust, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 751 (1966) ; Handler,
Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1966) ;
Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 823 (1965), and Aus-
tin, A Survey of Problems Encountered in Combating Reciprocal Trading Under Exist-
ing Trade Regulation Laws, 41 IND. L.J. 165 (1966).
6. For a discussion of reciprocal dealing agreements generally, see STOCKING,
WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 289-318 (1961).
7. Brief for the FTC, p. 23, FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
8. STOCKING, op. cit. supra note 6, at 289.
9. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) ; United States v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). United States v. Gen. Dy-
namics Corp., 35 U.S. LAW WEEK 2125 (1966).
10. See discussion infra, pp. 134-38.
11. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 35 U.S. LAW WEEK 2125 (Sept. 13,
1966).
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the reach of section 1.12 The same court had earlier held that reciprocity
may be an anticompetitive device since agreements giving rise to recip-
rocity, place restraints upon trade.'" However, the court at that time did
not answer the crucial inquiry-whether the restraints imposed on trade
by an agreement calling for reciprocity, are in all instances unreasonable.
This inquiry was partially answered a few weeks ago by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.' That
court declared that reciprocal agreements giving rise to reciprocity con-
stitute a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, provided a "not
insubstantial amount of commerce is affected."' 5  In so stating the law,
the district court rejected both the blanket per-se-illegal-decisional ap-
proach as well as the Brandeis-rule-of-reason technique (which effec-
tually permits each case to be decided on the totality of its particular
facts).
This note, although surveying various reciprocal practices, focuses
upon a particular business arrangement-the cross-franchise distribution
agreement. 6 Cross-franchising results in the practice denoted "recipro-
cal selling" as subsequently herein distinguished from "reciprocal buy-
ing."'" Prior to the analysis of distinguishable reciprocal dealing ar-
12. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
13. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 246 F.Supp. 156, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
14. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 35 U.S. LAW WEEK 2125 (Sept. 13,
1966).
15. Id. at 2126.
16. Under terms in cross-franchise agreements, the parties appoint each other as
agents for the respective distribution of each other's manufactured products. The cross-
selling aspect will be analyzed in detail in subsequent text discussion.
Franchise distribution is a method of product and/or service channel distribution
where generally the market supplier (who may or may not be the manufacturer) makes
an agreement with a distributor. Generally, the franchise limits the number of distri-
butors in a restricted and specific territory. Often only one franchised dealer is ap-
pointed for a particular area-called an exclusive franchise agent. Franchise provisions
may restrict the dealer from selling outside the specified territory-called closed fran-
chise provisions. These closed provisions have been frequently invalidated by the courts.
Yet, since 1945, franchise distribution has grown rapidly. Averill, Antitrust Considera-
tion of the Principle of Distribution Restrictions in Franchise Agreements, 15 AM. U.L.
REV. 28 (1964).
As a general proposition, exclusive as opposed to closed franchise-distributive ar-
rangements will be upheld if shown not to unreasonably restrain trade. United States
v. Bausch Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) ; accord, Schwing Motor Co. v. Hud-
son Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
For a general discussion of possible antitrust consequences resulting from closed
franchise agreements, see Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question
in the Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 286 (1963) (the author contends that territorial
limitations should be allowed only when a newcomer adopts such limitations for a rea-
sonable time).
17. See generally Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 823 (1965).
Analytically, reciprocal buying may be broken down into three categories:
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rangements there is presented a conceptual discussion of two principle
decisional techniques used by courts in applying section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Following this conceptual analysis is a discussion of case law
involving territorial division practices. The cases discussed illustrate the
courts' use and application of the contrasting decisional processes. Fi-
nally, the note suggests judicial application of the flexible rule of reason
decisional technique to reciprocal dealing situations. 8
Although this note is limited to a discussion of reciprocity under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act,1" it should be remembered that reciprocal
dealing may result not only in a "restraint of trade," but also in: (1) a
"substantial lessening of competition" as prohibited by section 3 of the
Clayton Act;2° (2) "an unfair method of competition" as prohibited by
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act;21 (3) "a tendency to
create a monopoly" as prohibited by section 3 of the Clayton Act ;22 and
(4) "price discrimination" as defined and prohibited under various pro-
visions of the Robinson-Patman Act.23
SUPREME COURT ANTITRUST DECISIONAL TECHNIQUE IN
APPLYING § 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that any agreement which
results in a restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with
foreign nations is illegal.24
first, coercive reciprocity induced by explicit or implicit force-'If you want
me to buy from you, you'd better buy from me'; second, consensual reciprocity
established by voluntary agreement of the parties-'I will buy from you and
you will buy from me'; and finally mutual patronage, absent any coercion or
agreement-'He has bought from me, ergo, I will buy from him.' Although
the lines separating these categories may not always be clear-cut in practice,
they nevertheless provide an instructive tool for discriminating antitrust treat-
ment ...
Handler, supra at 837.
18. The flexible rule of reason approach apparently was endorsed by the Supreme
Court in the White Motor Co. case, which held that vertical territorial distributive agree-
ments may not be within the per se category of illegality. White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
19. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
20. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
21. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
22. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
23. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
24. "Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign na-
tions is declared to be illegal." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
For a discussion of the legislative history and background of § 1, see generally
VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 20 (1963) ; Van Cise, The Future of
Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1964); Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine
-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 569, 571 (1964);
Chadwell, Competition and Section r of the Sherman Act-Instant Antitrust or Long
Run Policy?, 27 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 60 (1965), and Schwartz, A Law Profes-
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Historically, and primarily due to contrasting antitrust decisional
techniques used by the Supreme Court,25 there have developed two nomi-
nal categories of illegality within the purview of section 1. One cate-
gory comprises those agreements adjudged to be illegal per se, i.e., judi-
cially determined to be unjustifiable under any circumstances.26  The
second category of illegality consists of those agreements which courts
have held unreasonable in restraining trade or commerce under particular
circumstances.2
Employing a mechanistic dialysis of the above two categories, a
court often will first inquire whether the type of business agreement
may be justifiable-i.e., whether it is capable of being legally rationalized
by showing probable and consequential trade effects. If a court con-
siders the general "type" of agreement potentially justifiable, in effect
the court decides not to employ the expedient decisional technique of de-
sor's View of the Sherman Act-Fluid Fronts in the War Against Excessive Concen-
tration of Economic Power, 27 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 87 (1965).
25. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; Cf. Chi-
cago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
26. See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); accord, Holophane
Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
The commercial facts . . . may, on occasion, reveal a statutory restraint of a
nature clearly prohibited by the competitive objective of the antitrust laws such
as, for example, an agreement between competitors which establishes the prices
in, or excludes others from, the market. In this event the court will condemn
the conduct out of hand as indefensible, or per se in violation of these laws.
1955 ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Co-mx. ANTITRUST REP. 24, citing United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
Usually it is said that the 'per se' types under Section 1 are (a) horizontal
and vertical price fixing agreements, (b) horizontal allocation of markets and
customers, (c) tying arrangements, and (d) group boycotts.
CHADWELL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 63.
Few will quarrel with rules which condemn price agreements among competi-
tors to reduce market competition or to divide up the market. These rules deal
with the most obvious direct restraints of competition, and alone cover a high
percentage of the actual antitrust cases brought. But, even in these classic
areas, there is a danger of being too mechanical.
Chadwell, supra at 63, 64.
27. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In writing the
Court's opinion, Mr. Justice Brandeis formulated the now classic rule of reason to be
applied in § 1 prosecutions:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the re-
straint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question, the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint is imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court
to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, supra at 238.
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noting the agreement to be within the per se illegal category of section 1
violations.2" Subsequently, the court in determining the particular agree-
ment's legality or illegality will apply the so-called "rule of reason test."2 9
The phrase "rule of reason" tends to be misleading for the term
"rule" implies "certainty" in application. Antitrust analysis, however,
involves no such simplistic mathematical formulae."0 Rather, the rule of
reason "test" has developed as an intentionally vague standard affording
courts a flexible technique for deciding particular cases primarily on their
own facts."1 The two deceptively distinguishable categories of illegality
referred to above, reflecting contrasting decisional techniques, represent
convenient boundaries for an analytical discussion of section l's potential
28. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). But see
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), where the Court never
mentioned justification, but rather held that per se illegality resulted from an "actual or
potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy." See generally 1955
ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 23.
29. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). In this case,
Mr. Chief Justice White formulated what today is known generally as the rule of rea-
son. This rule of statutory construction, was further developed in the same year in
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
Construing both sections [of the Sherman Act], the Rule of Reason as the
general rule of construction . . . requires interpreting the Act in light of a
broad public policy favoring competition and condemning monopoly. While
Standard Oil gave the courts discretion in interpreting the word 'every' in Sec-
tion 1, such discretion is confined to consideration of whether in each case the
conduct being reviewed under the Act constitutes an undue restraint of com-
petitive conditions, or a monopolization, or an attempt to monopolize. This
standard permits the courts to decide whether conduct is significantly and un-
reasonably anticompetitive in character or effect; it makes obsolete once preva-
lent arguments, such as, whether monopoly arrangements would be socially pre-
ferable to competition in a particular industry, because for example, of high
fixed costs or the risks of 'cut-throat' competition or some other similar un-
usual conditions.
1955 ATT' GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 10. For a summary of the development
of the rule of reason doctrine and decisional technique, see generally Bergson, In Re-
straint of, 1953 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 49.
30. The predictive task of the attorney attempting to predetermine antitrust conse-
quences of a client's proposed intra or intercorporate agreement is a complicated process.
In addition to often confusing case law, the practitioner is confronted with vacillating
enforcement policies-policies promulgated 'by the Justice Department's Antitrust Divi-
sion, as well as the Federal Trade Commission. Furthermore, the attorney must be
knowledgable of arguable policy considerations while keeping abreast of continuing de-
velopments under four distinct but overlapping federal antitrust statutes. Add to this
labyrinth the numerous economic considerations which pervade antitrust law-corporate
bigness, relevant markets, competitive status, market dominance, market composition,
product differentiation, etc. Finally, to participate in the antitrust arena whether as a
litigator or counselor, the practitioner must know the language of antitrust specializa-
tion-market allocation, coercive reciprocity, tying agreements, resale price maintenance,
refusals to deal, customer allocation and/or preference, corporate conspiracy, vertical
integration, conglomerate mergers, group boycotts, horizontal territorial allocation,
patent grant backs and patent pools, exclusive and closed franchises, etc. Such termin-
ology may be likened to semantic tools, available to aid courts in attaining the objects
of a free enterprise economy.
31. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
et al.: The Future of Reciprocity: A Study in Antitrust Decisional Techni
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application to particular executory or executed business agreements chal-
lenged thereunder. Consequently, one may consider the labels "per se"
and "unreasonable" as nominal designators which have been judicially
applied as a result of using contrasting decisional techniques to the polar
extremities of section l's encompassment of illegal business agreements.
Although the results may be the same-for example, a determination of
illegality-the methods used to reach the eventual result are, as will be
shown subsequently, quite dissimilar.
Arguments favoring the use of the per se decisional technique in-
clude: (1) ease of judicial administration, 2 (2) the avoidance of what
otherwise might turn into protracted litigation ;3 (3) predictive certainty
resulting from an either/or approach ;4 (4) the avoidance of hard deci-
sions in close cases;' 5 (5) the probable discouragement of appeals and
petitions for writs of certiorari ;6 and (6) the possible discouragement of
corporate attempts to circumvent section 1." The administration of a
per se technique is simple. The court limits the factual determination to
32. Travers & Wright, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman
Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 795 (1962). See generally Ward, Franchise Restrictions: "Tied"
Sales and Territorial Limitations, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 66 (1966).
33. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court
stated:
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints
which are proscribed 'by the Sherman Act more certain in the benefit of every-
one concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated
and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether
a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruit-
less when undertaken.
Northern Pac., supra at 5.
34. During the past decade--indeed from the very birth of our federal anti-
trust laws in 1890-strong forces have urgently sought the evolution of some
automatic or per se rules of antitrust liability. And these forces are still at
work. On the one hand, the business community understandably has been 'hot
for certainty' in the law in order to be able to plan with assurance its day-to-day
transactions. Congress, the enforcement agencies, and the courts have wanted
to be able to avoid the complexities and delays resulting from large records in
prolonged trials, and accordingly they too have urged the adoption of simplified
tests of illegality.
These forces have worked together over the years in contributing to the
development of judicial rulings that certain, specified practices are per se un-
lawful under the antitrust laws.
Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VIR. L. REv. 1165, 1166 (1964).
35. By hard cases are meant those in which the restraints upon trade are counter-
balanced by economic facts which would tend to justify the agreement, according to the
classic formula of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918) ; see note 27 supra. See also Snap-On-Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d
825 (7th Cir. 1965).
36. It is suggested that appeals would increase if the flexible rule of reason deci-
sional technique were substituted in those situations which presently are decided by using
the per se technique. However, there is no authority for this assertion.
37. See, e.g., dissent in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 [1966], Art. 20
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the question essential for application of the per se standard-Did the
defendants agree to fix prices? If the evidence shows that they did agree,
the court decides that the agreement constitutes a per se violation
of section 1. Similarly, by limiting the factual inquiry, protracted litiga-
tion which could result from exhaustive attempts to show justification,
may be avoided." Moreover, an either/or polarity technique which ig-
nores the possibility of greys obviously affords a degree of predictive
certainty unattainable under a flexible decisional standard.39 Conse-
quently, by using the polarity approach courts avoid the necessity of
struggling to rationalize a hard decision, since per se seemingly overrides
what in lieu of per se technique would be called countervailing considera-
tions.4
The major defect in per se technique is that it tends to be overly
inclusive in application. An undesirable consequence of extending
the per se technique to a general category of distinguishable business
agreements is that traditional defenses to section 1 actions, defenses
based upon the doctrine of justification4 1-being permitted to attempt to
justify the agreement by showing economic necessity or by showing that
the agreement's effects did not unreasonably restrain trade or com-
merce-may be deemed immaterial. 2
The rule of reason technique, however, permits such defenses as a
newcomer's entry into a distant market, or a corporation's proportionally
insignificant share of its relevant market.43
38. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4383 (April 28,
1966), which held that the defendants had per se violated § 1 of the Sherman Act-that
upon a showing of the group boycott, the case became dispositive.
39. See Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1966). But see Bork, The Rule of Reason & The Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing & Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 777 (1965).
40. See generally Markham, Economic Analysis, 1954 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTION
145. See also STOCKING, WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 13-27 (1961).
41. See note 43 infra. See generally Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An
Opening Question in the Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 286 (1963).
42. In general, the significance of the "per se" concept is that upon a find-
ing that a certain type of agreement is present, the agreement is adjudged to
be 'unreasonably restrictive of competition' without further inquiry into intent,
effect, or other circumstances deemed relevant to a policy of competition. The
approach taken is not significantly different from that of nuisance law, for
example, where a court will call a boiler factory in a residential district a
'nuisance per se'-without scrutiny of the ffacts about how the boiler operates,
why it was built there, and what its actual effect on home owners would be.
Chadwell, Competition and Section s of the Sherman Act-Instant Antitrust or Long
Run Policy?, 27 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 60, 63 (1965).
43. The Supreme Court has never faced a situation in which an antitrust
defendant based its defense upon its status as a market newcomer; however, it
can be safely predicated from Court asides that such a defense would always
have considerable weight and would likely be dispositive in a number of in-
stances. . . . The term 'newcomer' as used herein, includes any company selling
et al.: The Future of Reciprocity: A Study in Antitrust Decisional Techni
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Although the per se technique affords methodological ease and pre-
dictive certainty unattainable under the more flexible rule of reason tech-
nique, when the per se approach is applied to an entire class of agreements
(for example, horizontal territorial division agreements), consistent ad-
herence to strict application could result in courts invalidating certain
intercorporate agreements the effects of which would foster and encour-
age interbrand competition."
The either it is per se illegal or per se legal approach of the funda-
mentalist seeking predictive certainty, typifies, as Professor Milton Hand-
ler points out,"' the polarity either/or approach to antitrust analysis."
Adhering to this predictive certainty goal, the Supreme Court utiliz-
ing the polarity technique has by numerous holdings4 7 denoted the follow-
ing general classes of business agreements to be per se violative of sec-
tion 1: price fixing;48 group boycotts;49 customer allocation;5" and allo-
its product in a market which is novel for that company; therefore, it may
refer to a new entrant into an established industry.
Flicker, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-Ins, Franchises, Territorials &
Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REV. 457 (1966). Flicker states his underlying assumption to be
that competition should be stimulated by encouraging product innovation and new in-
dustries, and by keeping "entry barriers to established industries at reasonable levels."
Flicker, supra at 457.
Concerning the issue of de minimis, or insubstantial effects--often said to be privi-
leged conduct of small business units-see generally Oppenheim, Small and Big Busi-
ness: Orientation of Antitrust Points and Counterpoints, 39 U. DET. L.J. 155 (1961).
44. See the discussion model of a reciprocal selling arrangement outlined subse-
quently in the text.
45. Handler, The Polarities of Antitrust, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 751 (1966).
46. Professor Handler discusses the development of the polarity theory, citing the
article 'by the late Professor Morris Cohen [Cohen, Concepts and Twilight Zones, 24
J. OF PHILOSOPHY 673 (1936)].
Cohen theorized that in order to make logic applicable to empirical issues, one must
invoke the "principle of polarity"; empirical facts are generally resultants of opposing
and "yet inseparable tendencies" like the north and south poles. Consequently, the twi-
light zones are those regions about the point of equilibrium of opposite tendencies. Co-
hen, supra at 678.
Applying Cohen's methodology, Handler views as antipodal positions, those who
would "apply black letter rules of per se illegality or per se legality to all forms of non-
coercive reciprocal dealings." Handler, supra at 755. "The judicial polarists, whether
they favor total validity or total invalidity, are essentially legal fundamentalists ...
The polar view thus enhances the certainty and enforceability of our rules. While I
strongly oppose this philosophy, I do not deny the potency of its rationale." Handler
supra at 756. See also HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 17 (1957).
47. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4383 (April 28, 1966);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) ; Klors,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) ; Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ; United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 322 U.S. 319
(1947) United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) ; E. States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914), and Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
48. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) ; accord, Appala-
chian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). But see Chicago Bd. of Trade
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cation resulting in division of markets.51
Yet, the fact that there are judicially recognized exceptions52 to these
per se classifications has caused some commentators to suggest that per se
technique is merely a shorthand method of indicating that a particular
agreement is unreasonable under any construction or application of the
rule of reason-that there is no possible justification, or at least, no jus-
tification was shown in the particular facts of the case presented for ad-
judication.5" However, there is sufficient language54 in Supreme Court
decisions which has warranted lower federal courts to strictly observe the
apparent distinction between the two classes of illegality."
Even if it is true that denoting a particular agreement as per se il-
legal is merely a summary method for deciding that the agreement is un-
reasonable, there nonetheless exists the possibility that courts will stamp
the per se label on a particular agreement before hearing and examining
all evidence which under the peculiar economic facts of the case might
legally justify the agreement. 6 The danger, in short, is that application
of the per se technique precludes opportunity for justification.
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940).
49. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4383 (April 28, 1966)
accord, Kors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
50. Boro Hall Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 317 U.S. 695 (1942).
51. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ; Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) ; accord, United States v. Nat'l
Lead Co., 322 U.S. 319 (1947). Contra, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963).
52. E.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) involving
resale price maintenance; White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) in-
volving vertical territorial restrictions.
53. The current shibboleth of per se illegality in existing law conveys a sense
of certainty, even of automaticity, which is delusive. The per se concept does
not accurately describe the law relating to agreements eliminating competitions
as it is, as it has been, or as it ever can be. Along side cases announcing a
sweeping per se formulation of the law, there has always existed a line of cases
refusing to apply it. Doubtless some of the cases in the latter group were
wrongly decided, but it would be naive to write them all off as simply in-
correct or aberrational. The persistent refusal of courts to honor the literal
terms of the per se rules against price-fixing and market division agreements
demonstrates a deep-seated though somewhat inarticulate sense that those rules,
as usually stated are inadequate.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
74 YALE L.J. 775, 777 (1965).
54. See, e.g., the opinion written by Mr. Justice Fortas in United States v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4383 (April 28, 1966).
55. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F.Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
United States v. Gen. Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) ; Cf. United
States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 40 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ; accord, United States v.
Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
56. An illustration of an agreement which although placing restraints on trade,
also results in permitting a substantial increase in effective interbrand competition
among actual competitors, will be presented subsequently in the text.
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DECISIONAL TECHNIQUE APPLIED
Illustrative of this absolutist either/or per se decisional technique
on the one hand, and the more flexible rule of reason on the other,
is the judicial history of territorial division practices following the
Supreme Court's decision in the Timken Roller Bearing case." Timken,
a United States based manufacturer of tapered roller bearings, entered
into agreements with a British company and subsequently a French com-
pany, whereby American Timken, British Timken and French Timken by
cross licenses agreed not to distribute or manufacture tapered roller bear-
ings outside of their respective marketing areas. The principal effect
and purpose of the agreements was to divide the production and distribu-
tion of tapered roller bearings into exclusive, segregated world markets.5"
The trial court found in its opinion" as a matter of fact,"0 and em-
phasized by the Supreme Court in its subsequent affirmance,"1 that these
companies enjoyed near total domination of their respective portions of
the relevant market. 2 American Timken possessed 78% of the relevant
United States tapered roller bearing market; French Timken's portion
amounted to 80% of its relevant market, while British Timken enjoyed
90% of its relevant market. The principal effect on international trade
which resulted from the agreements was the virtual elimination of ex-
ports and imports of tapered roller bearings into or out of the United
States. Consequently, the relevant market dominance enjoyed by Ameri-
can Timken in the United States did not merely go unchallenged, but
more significantly, was virtually unchallengeable.64
A close reading of the facts in Timken reveals that the case involved:
(1) patent license agreements including grant backs; (2) trademark li-
cense agreements; (3) linkage through stock ownership; (4) wholesale
distributive arrangements drawn up for and executed by competitors;
(5) marketing division agreements extending for over thirty-five years;
(6) a single product commonly manufactured; and (7) virtual dominance
of the relevant markets by the agreeing parties in their respective terri-
tories. In spite of this peculiar factual combination, certain courts subse-
quently cited Timken for the broad proposition that any agreement which
57. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
58. Ibid.
59. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
60. Ibid.
61. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
62. Id. at 597 (1951).
63. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
64. Id. at 604 (1951).
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provides for a division of markets per se violates section 1 of the Sherman
Act."'
Moreover, the Department of Justice prior to the White Motor case
of 1964,"6 took the position that territorial restrictions, whether imposed
by dealers (horizontal restrictions) or imposed on dealers (vertical re-
strictions) were per se unlawful. 7
Horizontal restrictions result from suppliers, dealers or manufac-
turers agreeing to divide marketing, retailing or manufacturing territories
respectively." Such arrangements have been characterized as agree-
ments among competitors to allocate markets. "9 Vertical restrictions, im-
posed by a manufacturer or distributor on his dealers or retailers, are of
two principal varieties: first, those restrictions based on a dealer's con-
sidered promise (usually a franchise) not to sell the manufacturer's
products outside a specified restricted marketing area, called closed ter-
ritorial restrictions;"7 second, those restrictions represented by a manu-
facturer's or distributor's promise not to appoint any other retail agent
or dealer within the restricted specified area assigned to a particular
agent or dealer, often labeled "exclusive" territorial restrictions, generally
in the form of an exclusive limited franchise.7'
In White Motor Company v. United States,"2 the Supreme Court in
65. See United States v. Hollophane Co., 119 F.Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954),
aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) ; accord, United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
100 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
66. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
67. The Justice Department in 1948 issued a policy statement declaring that in its
view, territorial and customer restrictions were illegal per se. See Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Automobile Marketing Legislation of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 362 (1956).
In the White Motor case, the Justice Department took the position that territorial
restrictions on dealers should be held unlawful per se. "The Supreme Court declined
to do so, on the ground that sufficient information was not available for making a
judgment of this kind." Address by Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General in
Charge of the Antitrust Division, prepared for delivery before the Antitrust Section
of the American Bar Association, Miami, Florida, August 10, 1965. For the latest state-
ment by Mr. Turner on the per se position of the Justice Department, see 1966 N.Y.
STATE BAR Ass'N ANTITRUST LAW SYMPosIuM 1-9.
68. See generally Rifkind, Division of Territories, in ANTITRUST LAW AND TECH-
NIQUES 49 (Hoffman ed. 1963) ; Travers & Wright, Restricted Channels of Distribu-
tion Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 795 (1962).
69. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
70. See generally Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in
the Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 286 (1963).
71. See generally Timberg, Territorial Exclusives, 29 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION
233 (1965).
A recent case applying the rule of reason technique is FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 34
U.S.L. WEEK 4468 (June 6, 1966).
For a survey of various distributive franchise agreements, see Stewart, Exclusive
Franchises and Territorial Confinements of Distributors, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION
33 (1963).
72. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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essence held that vertical territorial restrictions are not within the hori-
zontal territorial per se category of illegality, reasoning that vertical ar-
rangements may be justifiable at a trial by the introduction of evidence
showing the purpose as well as probable competitive and trade effects of
such arrangements.7" After winning the right to introduce evidence in
an attempt to show justification for its product distributive arrangement,
White Motor subsequently settled its litigation with the government by a
consent judgment74 in which White agreed not to impose any territorial
restrictions upon its retail dealers."
A further assault on the citadel of polarity per se technique as ap-
plied to territorial arrangements resulted from a number of decisions"
upholding the establishment of vertical distributive arrangements in
which the only territorial restriction contained in the franchise agree-
ment was the so-called "primary responsibility" provision, a provision
incorporated in many of the government's consent judgments. 7 Under
these provisions, the manufacturer may designate geographical areas in
which specific distributors would be primarily responsible for promoting
the manufacturer's product and would be obliged to adequately represent
the manufacturer in the designated area."
The tendency of courts to reject the per se approach, and thereby
sanction under certain circumstances territorial restrictions, is fur-
ther illustrated by the 1963 Seventh Circuit decision of Snap-On-
Tools Corp. v. F.T.C.7' There the Federal Trade Commission in seeking
73. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1961). The majority's
opinion concluded that "the applicable rule of law should be designated after trial." 372
U.S. 253, 261 (1963). For an interesting analysis of White Motor, see Bork, The Rule
of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775
(1965). Bork opines that the majority failed to state the criteria by which per se and
unreasonable categories of illegality are to be distinguished, suggesting the opinion is
ambiguous since it is capable of being read as premised on economic theory, or premised
on factors overriding economic considerations. Bork, supra at 778.
74. United States v. White Motors Co., 1964 Trade Cases 71195 (N.D. Ohio
1964).
75. Thus, the franchised dealers were permitted to seek sales outside their respec-
tive territories. Lack of such restrictions it is presumed, increases effective intrabrand
competition.
76. E.g., Boro Hall Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942),
rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942).
77. E.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill.
1965). The 26 cases are collected in Timberg, Territorial Exclusives, 29 A.B.A. ANTI-
TRUST SECTION 233, 235 n.10 (1965).
78. The "primary responsibility" clause was suggested by the "zone of influence"
case of Boro Hall Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), rehearing
denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942). In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan in
White Motor Co. suggested White Motor use this device. 372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963).
For a discussion of problems enforcing primary responsibility provisions, see Stew-
art, Exclhsive Franchises and Territorial Confinements of Distributors, 22 A.B.A. ANTI-
TRUST SECTION 33 (1963).
79. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
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to have affirmed its previous cease and desist order entered under sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,80 argued that geographic
restrictions placed on dealers who sold Snap-On-Tools were per se ille-
gal.8' The majority of the Seventh Circuit overruling the Commission 2
held that the White Motor" case governed in permitting a trial for pre-
sentment of evidence for possible justification of the arrangement. The
court added that the Commission's hearing "was the trial" and that Snap-
On had prevailed, noting that there were over eighty competing firms in
the hand tool industry. 4 The court indicated that any other less rigid
system of distribution would result in "confusion and chaos."8 5  Snap-On
stands for the proposition that the actual or, if unascertainable, probable
anticompetitive and trade effects resulting from a distributive agreement
must be shown at the trial, and if none are shown, the vertical distribu-
tive arrangement will be permitted.8"
Similarly, in 1964 the Sixth Circuit noted that a closed territorial
distributive system was not per se illegal, 7 holding that such an
agreement will be declared illegal only if shown either to be unreasonable
in restraining trade, or in constituting an unfair method of competition.88
In summary, the judicial history of territorial distributive arrange-
ments subsequent to the Timken decision 9 has been a history character-
ized by correlative tendencies: first, a tendency to limit the scope of per
se polarity technique; and second, the corresponding tendency to extend
factual situations to which the rule of reason technique may be applied.
A recent Supreme Court decision" applying section 1 of the Sher-
man Act was announced on April 28, 1966, in United States v. General
80. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
81. Brief for the FTC, p. 17, Snap-On-Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th
Cir. 1963).
82. Snap-On-Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
83. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
84. 321 F.2d 825 (1963). The majority noted that the Supreme Court in White
Motor refused to hold territorial vertical arrangements per se illegal. The majority in
Snap-On stressed the importance of effective interbrand competition, declaring:
Furthermore, we believe manufacturers should be encouraged by the workings
of the antitrust laws to meet and promote competition of their products with
those of competing brands, rather than to be hampered by those laws in the
'orderly' marketing of their products.
Snap-On-Tools, supra at 833.
Referring to a proposed alternative of assigning dealers areas of primary responsi-
bility, the majority concluded that this alternative would merely be a "sterile exercise in
language." Snap-On-Tools, supra at 832.
85. 321 F.2d 825, 833 (1963).
86. Ibid.
87. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
88. Id. at 851.
89. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
90. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4383 (April 28, 1966).
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Motors,"' involving both alleged group boycotts and alleged unreasonable
restrictive territorial agreements.
The factual background is significant. The trial court found that
by 1960 numerous Chevrolet franchised dealers located throughout the
Los Angeles, California metropolitan area had entered into agreements
with so-called "discount houses."92  Under terms in these agreements, a
discounter would sell new Chevrolet automobiles to buyers by referring
the buyer to a particular dealer. The buyer would pay the discounter a
price, substantially marked down from suggested retail prices. The dis-
counter would then retain a certain percentage of the net profit over
dealer cost, and the remaining proceeds would be turned over to the dealer.
These agreements were characterized as "referrals." 3  The majority of
Los Angeles Chevrolet dealers, however, opposed this referral program.
Their opposition resulted in an effective group boycott. The Justice De-
partment's Antitrust Division, upon complaints that discounters were go-
ing out of business, investigated. As a result of this investigation, the
Justice Department subsequently brought suit against various Chevrolet
dealer associations as well as against General Motors charging that by
concerted action, these defendants had eliminated the discount house re-
ferral business. 4 The Supreme Court in reversing the district court's
entry of judgment for the defendants 95-the order was appealed directly
under section 2 of the Expediting Act 9 -held that the factual findings
constituted by law a "classic conspiracy in restraint of trade" since the
franchised Chevrolet dealers were deprived of their freedom to trade
with and deal through discounters." The Court declared: "Elimination,
by joint collaborative action, of discounters from access to the market is
a per se violation of the [Sherman] Act."9 8
For purposes of this discussion, the General Motors case is signifi-
cant for the position the Department of Justice took both at the trial and
on appeal toward an issue which the Supreme Court did not decide, 9 de-
claring the issue to be nonessential to the determinative question of group
boycotting. The nonessential issue pertained to a so-called "location
clause" incorporated in the franchise agreements between General Motors
91. Id. at 4384.
92. Ibid.
93. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., supra note 90, at 4385.
94. Ibid.
95. The United States district court concluded that the proof failed to establish the
alleged violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964 ed.)
97. 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4383, 4386 (April 28, 1966).
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
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and each Chevrolet dealer. This clause prohibits a dealer from moving
to or establishing a new or different location, branch sales, or other sales
location, without obtaining prior written approval of General Motors."'
On the basis of this clause, General Motors as appellee maintained
that the referral agreements executed between a minority of the Los
Angeles Chevrolet dealers and area discount houses were in violation of
the standardized Dealer's Agreements. The Justice Department countered
by claiming that the location clauses were illegal as placing unreasonable
restraints upon trade. This position is significant as it represents a ma-
jor shift from the Department's pre-White Motor stand that all territorial
restrictions are illegal per se.'
Mr. Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, commented that the "lo-
cation clause" was of no avail against the fact of unlawful combina-
tion.10  Thus, the Court based its decision on what it considered to be
clear and convincing proof of a conspiracy in the nature of joint and con-
certed refusals to deal." 3 In accordance with earlier decisions, the Court
applied the per se technique to an obvious group boycott arrangement.
In sum, courts when confronted with factual situations involving
territorial exclusives, challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
have determined the legality or illegality of these arrangements by using
both the per se decisional technique (to horizontal division practices) and
the rule of reason technique (to vertical open arrangements). However,
a few courts would utilize the per se technique in blanket fashion. Such
an extension of what in essence amounts to a simplistic method for de-
ciding complex cases is unwarranted.
ACCOMMODATION RECIPROCITY
Discussion Model
OCO Corporation manufactures OBLETS. A thinly capitalized
corporation, OCO markets OBLETS in fourteen states east of the Mis-
sissippi through franchised dealers who agree to have the primary re-
sponsibility of selling and servicing OBLETS in certain specified geo-
graphical territories. The franchise agreements contain no exclusive
dealing, customer preference, customer restriction, resale price or tying
100. Ibid.
101. See note 6 supra. For the latest public statement of the Justice Department
regarding per se theory, see the published remarks of Donald F. Turner, Assistant At-
torney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, entitled
Some Reflections on Antitrust, in 1966 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N ANTITRUST LAW SYM-
POSiUM 1-9 (CCH, June, 1966).
102. 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4383, 4386 (April 28, 1966).
103. Ibid. See generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962).
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provisions. However, each franchise designates the territory in which
the franchise is to be exclusive.
Incorporating four years ago, OCO now desires to utilize more fully
existing distributor facilities by the procurement of a complementary line
of merchandise which could be marketed and serviced by OCO dealers.
Meanwhile, ICO, a California corporation, manufactures IBLETS.
IBLETS are commercially related to OBLETS, but the two commodities
have clearly distinguishable markets due to significant product differen-
tiation reflecting a wide variance in raw material costs. This product
differentiation may be envisioned if one imagines an OBLET to be either
a Rolls Royce or an $85.00 Swiss time piece, and an IBLET to be a
Simca or a $3.95 Little Ben watch.
ICO, vertically integrated, distributes IBLETS in seven western
states through an entirely owned marketing subsidiary, 1CO-M. ICO-M
likewise desires, by acquiring for distribution a complementary product
line, to utilize more fully its existing chain of staffed and operated retail
outlets. Eventually, OCO, ICO and ICO-M present to their respective
legal staffs the following proposed agreements:
ICO grants OCO an exclusive franchise distributorship in
order for OCO to distribute IBLETS, the duration of the grant
to run five years.
OCO in return agrees to appoint ICO-M the former's ex-
clusive agent for distribution of OBLETS in the seven west-
ern states where ICO-M currently is doing business. This pro-
posed agreement contains a further provision which provides
that although the license is exclusive, the licensee is not confined
to the expressed territory set out in the agreement for distribu-
tion of the licensor's product. However, the licensee agrees
that this territory shall be his area of "primary responsibility"
and that he will not actively seek sales outside this area.
Furthermore, OCO agrees not to compel directly or in-
directly through economic coercion its existing OBLET dealers
to also sell IBLETS, as a condition for sustaining or renewing
their franchise. Rather, OCO agrees to make a preferential
offering to OBLET dealers inviting them to also become
IBLET dealers. The ICO license is for five years.
Analysis of Reciprocal Practices
The above described cross-franchise agreement involves reciprocal
dealing, since two independent firms have agreed to buy and sell each
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other's products, supposedly for their anticipated mutual benefit."0 4 The
concept of reciprocity has been appropriately described as multi-faceted.'
Professor Handler distinguishes three situations all involving reciprocal
dealing: first, coercive reciprocity;... second, voluntary reciprocity;"'
and third, free and voluntary mutual patronage. °8
Beginning in the 1930's, the Federal Trade Commission attacked
coercive reciprocity as an unfair method of competition." 9 As Profes-
sor Handler points out, coercive reciprocity resembles quite closely a tie-
in since there is coercive use of power in one market to gain sales in
another."'
Like the tie-in, the anti-competitive effect of coercive re-
ciprocity is twofold: (1) The customer is forced to buy from a
particular supplier when he would not do so if left to his own
devices; and (2) competitors are foreclosed from selling to that
customer."'
When a seller patronizes customers not as a condition of sale or as
part of any bargain but as a matter of unilateral action and independent
decision, Handler argues, there should result no antitrust liability. Hand-
ler describes such arrangements as involving mere free and voluntary
mutual patronage." 2
In the ICO-OCO model above, the changing of a few facts will
alter substantially the economic and trade effects consequent to the agree-
ment. For example, suppose either ICO or OCO has established market
leadership in its relevant market; further, that the companies have been
in operation for ten years or longer. It should be apparent that under
such facts a cross-franchise agreement between ICO and OCO would
not only place restraints upon trade, but also might ultimately lessen com-
104. "'Business reciprocity' . . . describes business dealings between independent
firms whereby they make mutual concessions designed to promote the business interests
of each." STOCKING, WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 289 (1961).
105. Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1966).
106. Handler, supra note 105, at 3.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. California Packing Corp., 25 FTC 379 (1932) ; Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 FTC
67 (1932) ; Waugh Equip. Co., 15 FTC 232 (1931).
110. Handler, supra note 105, at 5.
111. Ibid.
112. Handler opines that voluntary reciprocity does not involve coercion or duress,
but does imply an agreement to deal reciprocally. Handler observes that mutual patron-
age implies no agreement at all. Handler suggests rather that mutual patronage in-
volves voluntary unilateral actions. See Handler, supra note 105, at 6. He seemingly
implies that economic convenience rather than economic compulsion forms the basis of
mutual patronage agreements. Handler, supra note 105, at 7.
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petition by increasing the multiplicity of contacts among competitors.
The net effect might be similar if not identical to the so-called conglom-
erate merger situation."1 '
Reciprocal Selling
A cross-franchise agreement has some similarity to what is often
referred to as reciprocal buying arrangements. Fundamentally, recipro-
cal buying involves use by a firm of its buying power to promote its
sales. 14 It is little more than "I'll patronize you if you patronize me."
Typically, reciprocal buying involves a service for a product.1 Thus,
some railroads at one time offered to purchase their steel and coal needs
113. As I understand the term, a 'conglomerate' enterprise is one that does
business in a number of separate markets. These separate markets involve
different 'product' markets, or they may involve separate 'geographic' markets
in the same product. We have learned to refer to the first as a 'product ex-
tension' and the second as a 'market extension' merger. In either case, a firm
selling, say, 25 different products, and one selling a single product in 25 dif-
ferent geographic markets, would both have the essential characteristics; each
of them-to quote Professor Edwards-operates in a series of different mar-
kets, in each of which it encounters different competitors and different condi-
tions of demand and supply and thus may be able to charge different prices and
make different profits.
The conglomerate acquisition often raises some of the same problems as
the more conventional horizontal merger, but with special complications of its
own. Take the basic question of whether the acquisition poses a danger of
ultimate single-firm dominance, of some form of "price leadership." It is of-
ten said that the conglomerate firm-by reason of its general overall superiority
of resources, its capacity to 'subsidize' local expansion out of profits earned in
other markets, and the like-is apt to dominate the local market in which the
acquisition occurs, ultimately becoming, if not a monopoly in the classical sense
of the word, certainly enough of 'price leader' to impose on the market a price
well in excess of a genuinely competitive price.
Then there is the question of whether the merger increases the likelihood
that the oligopoly Congress was so concerned about will eventually emerge.
Conglomerate mergers are said to pose a double danger on this score. The ac-
quiring conglomerate firm will be susceptible not only to all of the local
oligopoly-producing forces, put to a variety of influences stemming from its
operations in all of its other markets as well. As a firm expands the number of
its markets in which it operates, it begins to encounter many of the same com-
petitors in different areas. This 'multiplicity of their contacts' may 'blunt the
edge of their competition.'
Dixon, Merger Policy and the Preservation of the Competitive System, 30 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SECTION 86, 88 (1966).
114. "Reciprocal dealing is both the use of purchasing power to obtain sales
and the practice of preferring one's customers in purchasing."
Hausman, Reciprocal Buying and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REv. 873 (1964).
Writing prior to the 1965 Consolidated Foods decision, Hausman commented that the le-
gality under § 1 of the Sherman Act was unresolved "because there are no decided
cases." Hausman, supra at 886. For a discussion of the various economic interpreta-
tions regarding reciprocal buying, see Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity:
An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 552, 566 (1965).
115. See generally Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in
NAT'L BuR. OF ECONOMIC RES., BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 331, 342
(1955).
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from those companies who in consideration therefor, would ship on those
railroads in lieu of using competitive lines.1 '
Cross-franchising, however, essentially involves what might best be
described as reciprocal selling since the basis of the reciprocity rests upon
the mutual selling potential of the two firms, rather than on present
buying need. Unlike the railroad above which needed coal to stoke loco-
motives and steel to construct its track, ICO and OCO do not need each
other's product for their respective continued economic existence.
Consequently, reciprocal buying often results from what in essence
amounts to a forced sale-coerced by one party having a dominant bar-
gaining position, as e.g., a manufacturer's essential-material supplier.
Thus, a reciprocal buying agreement which would require such a manu-
facturer to sell finished products to the supplier as consideration for the
supplier's promise to continue selling essential-materials to the manu-
facturer, would place a restraint on trade not only between the supplier
and other manufacturers, but more significantly, also between the manu-
facturer and other would be buyers. In such arrangements, inducement
for the reciprocal buying agreement would stem from present economic
needs. " 7
In situations which have involved so-called reciprocal buying prac-
tices, coercion is often the dominant theme. For example, suppose ICO
needs material A. Further, suppose ICO has a substantial need for ma-
terial A and pursuant thereto, ICO goes to OCO and says: "I will buy
all my A requirements from you, but only if you in turn agree to buy all
your B requirements from me." Often this coercive arrangement in-
volves three parties. Thus, ICO might say to OCO: "I will buy my A
requirements from you, but only if you buy your B requirements from
Company Z." It is obvious that such coerced reciprocal dealing could
result in lessening of competition in addition to placing restraints ol the
potential flow of trade.
In contrast, the inducement for a cross-selling franchise is not the
existing buying power of the parties resulting from current needs, but
rather is the anticipated mutual selling potential of the parties based upon
reasonable expectations of available markets. The fact that a cross-
franchise agreement, wherein two companies agree to expand existing
marketing capability through cross-selling of dissimilar products, is mu-
tually advantageous does not mean there also will result either a lessening
116. Reciprocity in Purchasing and Routing, 188 ICC 417, 418 (1932); see gen-
erally STOCKING, op. cit. supra note 104, at 293. According to the ICC's 1932 report,
railroads generally engaged in reciprocal practices with shippers during the 1920's and
early 1930's. 188 ICC 417, 419 (1932).
117. See STOCKING, op. cit. s=pra note 104, at 293.
et al.: The Future of Reciprocity: A Study in Antitrust Decisional Techni
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1966
THE FUTURE OF RECIPROCITY
of competition, or an unreasonable restraint on trade. By means of a
cross-franchise agreement substantially identical to the model above out-
lined, a newcomer's entry into a market may increase interbrand competi-
tion within that market, while not placing any unreasonable restraint
on trade.
For example, suppose A Mower Co. has 17% of the relevant lawn
mower market in Texas, but none of the relevant mower market in Okla-
homa. Also, suppose B Mower Co. has 24% of the relevant Texas mower
market, and 31% of the Oklahoma mower market. Thus, A and B are
competitors. Now, suppose X Garden-Tool Co. possesses 12% of Okla-
homa's relevant garden tool market, but none of the Texas market. Fur-
ther suppose, Y Garden-Tool has 29% of the Texas garden tool market
as well as 14% of the Oklahoma market. Thus, X and Y are competi-
tors. Both A Mower and X Garden-Tools distribute through franchised
dealers, under exclusive franchise agreements. A and X respectively
wish to more effectively compete with B and Y respectively. Thus, they
enter into an agreement similar to the ICO-OCO agreement above de-
scribed. Possible competitive effects resulting from the agreement be-
tween A Mower and X Garden-Tool are shown by the following table.
MARKET COMPOSITION BEFORE AND ONE YEAR AFTER THE AGREEMENT
Company Market % Before % After
A M ower ......... Texas ............. 17% ................ 17%
B M ower ......... Texas ............ 24% ................ 24%
X Garden-Tool .... Texas ............. 0% ................ 6%
Y Garden-Tool .... Texas ............ 29% .............. 23%
A Mower ......... Oklahoma ......... 0% ................. 8%
B Mower ......... Oklahoma ......... 31% ................. 23 %
X Garden-Tool .... Oklahoma ......... 12% ................ 12%
Y Garden-Tool .... Oklahoma ......... 14% ................ 14%
As a result of the cross-selling agreement, A and X are able to dis-
tribute in markets previously dominated by B and Y respectively. Con-
sequently, A competes with B for the Oklahoma mower market, while X
competes with Y for the Texas garden tool market. Note that the agree-
ments which enabled the parties to enter the marketing territories of
their competitors involve "reciprocity."" ' 8 Moreover, the agreement also
results in a restraint of trade, A and X being restricted from trading with
other distributors in their respective franchised territories. But since
the Supeme Court has recognized the fact that every intercorporate agree-
118. See suggested general definition of reciprocity incorporated in note 104 supra.
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ment by its very nature places a restraint on trade to some extent, the
crucial inquiry becomes whether the above conjectured reciprocal selling
arrangement constitutes an unreasonable restraint.
To determine the issue of reasonableness of restraint, all the eco-
nomic effects flowing from the agreement must be considered." 9 So
considering the above hypothetical, one notes that the agreement enabled
A and X to enter and thereby compete for the markets controlled by B
and Y respectively.
Now, suppose C, a garden tool retail chain located in Oklahoma, of-
fers to purchase and distribute A's mowers in Oklahoma, in addition to
other brands of mowers which C distributes and retails through its chain
stores. By provisions of the franchise agreement with X, A would be
compelled to reject C's offer. Thus, the agreement between A and X
constitutes a restraint on trade-as between A and C. In this hypo-
thetical, C represents a potential distributor of A's mowers, and as such,
may be considered a "potential" competitor of X, who, in addition to
actually competing with Y for the Oklahoma garden tool market, also
distributes A's mowers throughout the state pursuant to provisions of
the cross-selling agreement.
Therefore, the precise issue involved is: Whether an increase in ef-
fective competition between actual competitors (manufacturers A and
B), resulting from a cross-selling agreement between manufacturer A
and distributor X, justifies a restraint on trade between manufacturer A
and other potential distributors (for example, C), who in effect are
potential competitors of distributor X. The issue as above formulated
goes only to the reasonableness of one side of the cross-selling agreement.
The overriding economic issue is whether a restraint on trade is
reasonable when the agreement which resulted in the restraint also re-
sulted in increasing effective interbrand competition among actual
competitors.
Recent Decisions
In light of these economic considerations, it seems unrealistic that a
court might categorically label "reciprocity" an "anticompetitive device"
without attempting to ascertain all the economic effects of an agreement
challenged under section 1. Moreover, to declare reciprocal dealing agree-
ments to be per se violative of the Sherman Act would evidence a desire to
find an easy solution to difficult problems of economic interpretation.
A decision involving reciprocity was announced by the United
119. Snap-On-Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1961) ; accord, Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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States District Court for the Southern District of New York in July,
1965, in United States v. General Dynamics Corp."' This civil antitrust
action charged that the defendant had violated not only section 7 of the
Clayton Act, but also section 1 of the Sherman Act by a merger and a
resulting special sales program. Specifically, in 1957 General Dynamics
Corporation merged with Liquid Carbonic Corporation, which at that
time was the nation's largest producer of carbon dioxide. The govern-
ment charged first that as a result of this merger there would eventually
result a substantial lessening of competition, and that the merger would
have the effect of tending to create a monopoly, both of which are pro-
hibited by Clayton's section 7.
After the acquisition of Liquid Carbonic, General Dynamics entered
into a special sales program with its suppliers whereby sales of these sup-
pliers of products manufactured by Carbonic's facilities were encouraged.
The government charged that these "sales" amounted to a reciprocal prac-
tice tending to lessen competition in violation of Clayton's section 7, as
well as placing restraints on trade, thereby violating section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Professor Handler characterizes the decision as illustra-
tive of "lump concept thinking.""' Yet, rather than declaring recip-
rocity to be per se violative of the Sherman Act, the Court declared:
It is also abundantly clear that the purpose of the [sales] pro-
gram, reciprocal dealing, is one of the 'anticompetitive practices
at which the antitrust laws are aimed' and 'an irrelevant and
alien factor' which may affect an otherwise unimpeded competi-
tive choice. . . . A branch of the defendant's argument before
this court has been that reciprocity is a normal and expected
business practice without any aura of illegality surrounding it.
Insofar as the generic status of reciprocity is concerned, Con-
solidated foods silences any argument of per se legality. [
93
Though this § 1 charge is a matter of first impression, the novel
aspects concern the characterization and classification of the
effects of reciprocity, not of its essential nature.""' [emphasis
supplied].
In a significant footnote [39], the court states: "Of course it does not
follow, however, that the use of reciprocity is per se illegal."
The court's decision specifically overruled defendant's motion to
120. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
See 54 GEO. L.J. 680 (1966).
121. Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1966).
122. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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dismiss the government's complaint. 123 The decision is to be commended
for opening the door for investigation into the effects of reciprocity. Pro-
fessor Handler, on the other hand, observes that the judge follows the
modern practice of painting with a broad brush. "He does not pause to
define what he terms the essential nature of reciprocal dealing. ,,124
It is true that in the 1965 General Dynamics decision 2 ' Judge Cannella
did not distinguish reciprocal arrangements on the basis of their essential
nature as has Professor Handler. For Judge Cannella in his 1965 ruling
indicated that the legality or illegality of reciprocal agreements should
depend on the effects of the agreements, not on the agreements them-
selves. Professor Handler, on the other hand, would adjudge a particu-
lar reciprocal arrangement primarily on the inducement factor, contend-
ing that coercive reciprocity is anticompetitive, whereas mutual and volun-
tary reciprocity (including most instances of reciprocal buying) is not.
If Judge Cannella impliedly rejected Professor Handler's analysis
in the 1965 General Dynamics ruling, the judge expressly and affirma-
tively rejected the inducement criterion in his 1966 General Dynamics de-
cision."' Reciprocity, the judge declared, whether mutual or coercive,
serves to exclude competitors by the exercise of large scale purchasing
power. He then analogized reciprocity to tying-in arrangements, hold-
ing that for purposes of applying section 1, the standards of decision as
delineated by the Supreme Court in tying-in cases are appropriate for de-
ciding the legality or illegality of reciprocal agreements.
Applying the technique as used by the Supreme Court in Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,12 7 and International Salt v.
United States,2 ' the judge declared that reciprocal arrangements are not
per se violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act if a "not insubstantial
amount of commerce is affected." '2 9  To prove the presence of anti-
competitive reciprocity, Judge Cannella stated that particular contracts
with identifiable parties must be introduced into evidence or legitimately
inferred from the conduct of such identifiable parties.13 The court's
analysis of the section 1 aspect of the General Dynamics litigation may
have been unnecessary because the court held that General Dynamic's
acquisition of Liquid Carbonic followed by the reciprocal sales program
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. This holding was in accordance
123. Id. at 158.
124. Handler, supra note 121, at 3.
125. 246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
126. United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 35 U.S. LAW WEEK 2125 (Sept. 13, 1966).
127. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
128. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
129. 35 U.S. LAW WEEK 2125, 2126 (Sept. 13, 1966).
130. Ibid.
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with the acquisition-reciprocity principle announced by the Supreme
Court in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp."' That case concerned spe-
cifically the issue whether reciprocal buying following a conglomerate
merger was shown to have resulted in a lessening of competition."' The
Federal Trade Commission had found at the initial hearing that competi-
tion was lessened as a result of reciprocal practices.13 Subsequently, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the Commission's finding,' and ultimately the
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit."' The facts as presented
revealed a situation involving coercive reciprocity."' The Court's opinion,
however, did not use the term "coercive." Moreover, the Court appar-
ently chose neither to discuss nor distinguish various reciprocal arrange-
ments, either on the basis of distinguishable inducements, or on the basis
of clearly ascertainable market effects. Nor, for that matter, did the
Court refer to the practices denoted either as accommodative reciprocity




To hold reciprocal selling per se illegal would contravene judicially
acknowledged Congressional policy underlying enactment of the antitrust
laws-a policy favoring rigorous competition in free markets." 9  While
certain reciprocal practices which can be shown to lessen competition and
place unreasonable restraints upon trade are obviously prohibited by the
antitrust laws, other reciprocal practices under certain market and other
economic conditions may be justifiable. To justify a reciprocal agree-
ment one must convince a court that the resulting competitive benefits of
the agreement outweigh the resulting restraints on trade. To balance
131. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
132. Id. at 594.
The first commission merger case to reach the Supreme Court, FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., resulted in a landmark decision holding that the
acquisition by Consolidated Gentry, Inc., violated section 7 of the Clayton Act
because of the opportunities it created for the operation of anticompetitive re-
ciprocity. Following this decision of the Supreme Court, the Commission is
conducting investigations of acquisitions which may create similar opportunities
for the use of reciprocity in other industries.
133. - FTC - (1964), 1964 FTC Docket 700.
134. Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964).
135. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
136. See note 114 supra.
137. Brief for the FTC, p. 23, FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592
(1965).
138. Handler, supra note 121, at 5.
139. Basic to the faith that a free economy best promotes the public weal is
that goods stand the cold test of competition; that the public, acting through
the market's impersonal judgment, shall allocate the Nation's resources and
thus direct the course its economic development will take.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
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economic pros and cons, a court must use a technique for decision making
which is flexible-a technique capable of considering all economic, com-
petitive and trade effects consequent to a particular agreement.
In sum, it is suggested that courts should ascertain the overall effects
on both trade and competition of any challenged reciprocal agreement.
Professor Handler's analysis of the competitive-anticompetitive nature
of a reciprocal agreement fails to consider as decisionally-determinative
the agreement's overall effects on trade and competition. Judge Can-
nella, on the other hand, in his 1966 General Dynamics decision
considers the effects of the agreement on trade but refuses to consider
the effects on competition. Thus, Judge Cannella has used a modified
per se technique-if a substantial amount of trade is affected as a result
of a particular agreement, then the agreement is per se violative of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. This limited-inquiry technique could lead to
unfortunate decisions. For as this note has attempted to show, a par-
ticular agreement may, while placing restraints on trade, foster a substan-
tial increase in effective interbrand competition among actual competi-
tors. Consequently, to determine the legality or illegality of any particu-
lar agreement, an overall analysis of the totality of economic facts sur-
rounding the agreement is appropriate. The timeless Brandeis-rule-of-
reason approach permits such thoroughness.
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